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§3. No act or agreement of the buyer before, at the
time of, or after, the making of a contract for the
purchases of newly constructed improvements on
realty, nor any agreement or statement by the
buyer in such contract shall constitute a valid wai-
ver of the provisions of §1.
Perhaps the most immediate remedial effort would lie
in a third direction. In the instant case, as in perhaps a
majority of development home cases, the purchaser had
an F.H.A. mortgage loan.' s Modifications of existing F.H.A.
regulations requiring higher standards of workmanship and
materials, and their enforcement by that agency might
effectively encourage irresponsible builders more ade-
quately to prepare plans and perform construction con-
tracts. For the practicing attorney at the present time, the
only method of protecting his client would seem to be to
compel the builder, at the time of the conveyance, to sign
a warranty agreement. Under the decided cases it would
appear that such an agreement, being collateral in nature,
would not be merged in the subsequent conveyance.19
NELSON R. KEI, JR.
Implied Invitation
Crown Cork and Seal Co. v. Kane'
Appellee Kane, in the course of his employment as a
truck driver, was sent to pick up freight at appellant's
warehouse. He had to drive up to a loading platform adja-
cent to appellant's parking lot. Smoking was prohibited in
the yard, on the loading platform, and in the warehouse.
iS212 Md. 402, 407, 129 A. 2d 518 (1957). The F. H. A. form provided:
"'The construction shall equal or exceed the applicable FHA Mini-
mum Construction Requirements and shall comply with applicable codes
and regulations, zoning ordinances, restrictive covenants, and the ex-
hibits submitted with the related application, as corrected by FHA.
The highest of all the aforegoing shall govern. Each item of material
or equipment shall equal or exceed that described or indicated. All
parts shall be sound and all construction free of faults. All work shall
be performed in a workmanlike manner and in accordance with the
best practice. * * *' "
Rosenthal v. Heft, 155 Md. 410, 142 A. 598 (1928) ; Edison Realty Co.
v. Bauernschub, 191 Md. 451, 62 A. 2d 354 (1948) ; Laurel Realty Co. v.
Himelfarb, 194 Md. 672, 72 A. 2d 23 (1950).
1213 Md. 152, 131 A. 2d 470 (1957).
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There was, however, a smoking room in the cellar of the
warehouse.
The appellee was told by the shipping clerk that it
would be some time before his truck was loaded and to
"take it easy". He went through the warehouse to the
smoking room as he had often done before. When return-
ing through the warehouse, he was struck and injured by
a fork lift truck driven by an employee of the appellant.
Kane testified that he had used the smoking room on
perhaps thirty previous occasions. He had first learned
about it six or seven years before the accident when one
of the checkers had told him to go down there and not to
smoke elsewhere. He testified that many of the other
truckers habitually used the room. However, the fore-
man of the shipping department testified that the smoking
room was for the use of the employees only. He further
stated that when he had seen visiting truckers in there,
"he chased them right back out". The Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court and permitted recovery, holding
that Kane was a business invitee even while going to and
from the smoking room. Judge Prescott dissented on the
grounds that an "invitee is limited to the 'area of invita-
tion', which is that part or parts of the premises that the
owner has thrown open to him for the purpose which
makes him an invitee".2
The charge to the jury offered them only two possibili-
ties: Kane was a trespasser or he was an invitee. The
question remains whether Kane might have been found
to be a licensee while coming from the smoking room, and
if so whether the standard of care owed to him would
have been any higher than if he had been found to be a
trespasser.' The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS would seem to
be authority for offering the jury this third choice -
finding that Kane was a licensee.4 The RESTATEMENT,
before it will classify one as a business invitee, requires
that there be some economic interest between the parties,
whereas a great many courts require only that there be
an implied invitation from the landowner or occupier. 5
Ibid., di8. op. 164, 165.
0 The Court declined to rule on this since the defentant made no timely
objection to the charge of the lower court. Ibid., 162-3.
' 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §330 defines a licensee as "a person who
is privileged to enter or remain upon land by virtue of the possessor's con-
sent, whether given by invitation or permission." §332 classifies one as a
business visitor only if he is on the land or premises "for a purpose directly
or indirectly connected with business dealings between them."
5 For a more thorough discussion of the implied invitation or economic
benefit theory see PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS (2nd ed. 1955) 452, §78.
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Although there was originally an economic interest be-
tween Kane and the defendant, it is possible that the busi-
ness relationship was suspended during Kane's visit to the
smoking room.
The Maryland Courts have shown a tendency to declare
one a licensee rather than an invitee if there is no economic
benefit involved. In Peregoy v. Western Md. R.R. Co.,6
the Court said that if one enters with the possessor's con-
sent and for the sole interest of the one who is entering,
then he is a licensee. The Court further stated:
"An invitee or business visitor is one invited or per-
mitted to enter or remain upon land for a purpose
connected with or related to the business of the
occupant. '7
It should be noted that, used in this context, economic
benefit is not limited to situations in which the particular
visit promises direct, immediate benefit to the owner or
occupier of the premises. This point was well illustrated
in Gordon Sleeprite Corp. v. Waters.' The plaintiff had
gone to collect a bill at the defendant's office and find-
ing no one there crossed a yard in back of the office, en-
tered defendant's factory and fell into an elevator shaft.
The Court found that he was a bare licensee while in the
factory. If the plaintiff had been injured while in the
office, it can be assumed that he would have been an in-
vitee but in going beyond the area of invitation he lost the
status of invitee.
The same problem arose in the fourth circuit in Elkton
Auto Sales Corporation v. State of Maryland.10 The defen-
dant's business was divided into a show room and a repair
shop. The defendant testified that the shop was private
and not open to the public. Ferry had gone to the repair
shop and was killed. Evidence was shown that customers
had entered the repair shop to buy supplies. The dominant
purpose of the decedent's visit at the time of the accident
was to obtain some oil, but at the same time he conversed
with defendant's mechanic regarding possibility of addi-
tional work on another automobile awaiting repairs. The
6202 Md. 203, 95 A. 2d 867 (1953).
'Ibid., 207.
8165 Md. 354, 168 A. 846 (1933).
Ibid., 358:
"When the plaintiff wandered Into the factory of the defendant, he
was a bare licensee, Intruder or volunteer, to whom the defendant,
under the circumstances, owed no duty of protection ..
1053 F. 2d 8 (4th Cir. 1931).
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circuit court affirmed a judgment 'for plaintiff in finding
that Ferry was an invitee and stated:
"The substance of the charge was that the jury
might find the status of Ferry was that of an invitee
if the defendant by its conduct impliedly invited the
public to its repair shop. It is well-established law
that the defendant's invitation may be either express
or implied.""
Although this statement by the court merely mentions ex-
press or implied invitation, it may still be assumed that the
decedent by going to purchase oil still had some economic
dealings with the defendant.
It appears that the prior Maryland cases insisted upon
a benefit derived or at least a possibility of a benefit to the
landowner or occupier as one of the essentials of business
invitation. Even though many of these cases make no
specific mention of benefit or mere permission, it appears
that economic benefit was present in all cases where plain-
tiff was held to be an invitee.2 Judge Prescott, dissenting
in the instant case, states:
"While I have not completely exhausted the sub-
ject, I have found no previous case in Maryland
where the 'economic' theory has been totally disre-
garded; .... 18
The instant case (particularly viewed in the light of Gordon
Sleeprite Corp. v. Waters)'4 presents a real question
whether the element of economic benefit, apparently essen-
tial to Kane's status as an invitee, was present during
the period in which he was going to, occupying and return-
ing from the smoking room. If the trial judge had given
fuller instructions to the jury, it is entirely possible that
they would have found Kane to be a licensee only at the
time of the injury since it is fairly apparent that Kane
went beyond the area of invitation. Prior cases strongly
- Ibid., 12.
A permissive user was involved in Myzkiewicz v. Filling Stations, 168
Md. 642, 178 A. 856 (1935). There the defendant had habitually allowed
the plaintiff to cut across its filling station. The court held the plaintiff
to be a bare licensee. On the other hand, however, in Burke v. Md., Del.,
and Va. R.R. Co., 134 Md. 156, 106 A. 353 (1919), the defendant let people
come to its wharf for the purpose of going on its steamboat to purchase
food. The plaintiff, while waiting to board the boat, was injured. The
court in reversing judgment for the defendant found that since the plain-
tiff would have been an invitee in the store of the defendant he was also
an Invitee while waiting to enter the store.
"213 Md. 152, dis. op. 164, 165, 131 A. 2d 470 (1957).
"165 Md. 354, 168 A. 846 (1933).
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suggest that one must stay in the area of invitation to pre-
serve his status as invitee.1
While there may be some doubt in Maryland as to when
one is a licensee and when one is an invitee, the duty owed
to each is more easily determined. In Benson v. Baltimore
Traction Company, 6 the plaintiff as part of a class visited
the defendant company. The plaintiff's class had asked to
be invited and the defendant gave its permission. The
Court in affirming a judgment for the defendant quoted the
Massachusetts case of Sweeney v. Old Colony Etc. R.R.
Co.:"
" 'The owner of the land is not bound to protect or
provide safeguards for wrong-doers. So a licensee who
enters on premises by permission only, without any
enticement, allurement or inducement being held out
to him by the owner or occupant, cannot recover dam-
ages for injuries caused by obstructions or pitfalls. He
goes there at his own risk and enjoys the license sub-
ject to its concomitant perils. No duty is imposed by
law on the owner or occupant to keep his premises in
a suitable condition for those who come there solely
for their own convenience or pleasure, and who are
not either expressly invited to enter or induced to
come upon them by the purpose for which the premises
are appropriated and occupied, or by some preparation
or adoption of the plan for use by customers or pas-
sengers, which might naturally and reasonably lead
them to suppose that they might properly and safely
enter thereon'."' 8
It seems reasonable to say that the duty owed to a
licensee is fairly well settled in Maryland. However, there
still remains some doubt as to when one will be held to
be a licensee and when one will be classified as an invitee.
Although apparently not mentioned in any case, there
seems to be a possibility, from the facts in the Kane 9 case,
that when a person enters premises as a business invitee
and then exceeds his invitation, he will be classified an
invitee if there was a custom or implied invitation for
" In Riganis v. Mottu, 156 Md. 340, 144 A. 355 (1929), the court was
careful to point out that plaintiff was asked to inspect lumber in a certain
part of the yard. It can be assumed from this careful distinction that
parts of a business place can be area of invitation and other places are not.
'e77 Md. 535, 26 A. 973 (1893).
1 10 Allen (92 Mass.) 368, 87 Am. Dec. 644 (1865).
"Supra. n. 16, 542.
19213 Md. 152, 131 A. 2d 470 (1957).
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him to go to the place not originally covered by his in-
vitation. However, if he wanders to a place where he had
never been before or clearly had no right to go, then it
seems more likely he will be classified a licensee or perhaps
even a trespasser. This question of status on implied in-
vitation or custom will remain in doubt until a clearer view
is taken by the Court.
ALLAN B. BLUMBERG
Amended Definition Of Sale To Include
Food Consumed On Premises
Effective June 1, 1958, a new definition of the word sale
was added to the Maryland Uniform Sales Act:
"'Sale' includes a bargain and sale as well as a sale
and delivery and also the serving or providing of food
for human consumption by any caterer, or by any res-
taurant, hotel, boarding house, dining room or any
other eating establishment."'
The effect of this addition will, it would clearly seem,
result in bringing food purchased in a restaurant for im-
mediate consumption under the definition of an implied
warranty.
Prior to this change in the statute, the only case present-
ing the question of whether food purchased in a restaurant
was a sale or a service was Dining Hall Co. v. Swingler.2
There, the plaintiff entered the defendant's restaurant and
ordered a sandwich. When she bit into the bread, a piece of
tin lodged in her mouth causing serious injury. The Court,
in reversing judgment for the plaintiff, concluded that the
purchase and eating of food on the premises was not a sale
within the meaning of the Sales Act.' The feeling was
expressed that if a sale were found, and therefore an im-
17 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1958), Art. 83, §94(1). It should be noted that
this is an amendment to the Uniform Sales Act in Maryland by the Mary-
land General Assembly, and not one promulgated by the Commissioners on
Uniform Laws. The portion added at the end is italicized.
173 Md. 490, 197 A. 105 (1938), noted, 2 Md. L. Rev. 277 (1938).8 Ibid., 503. The Court there said:
"We hold that an action in tort in such cases as this affords to the
Injured person a convenient and adequate remedy, and disposes of the
contention that the adoption of the negligence theory, rather than that
of an implied warranty, would amount to a practical denial to those
injured in cases from food adulteration, foreign substances or unmer-
chantable quality."
